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The Validity of Validity in Debra P.: Judicial And Psychometric Perspectives on Test
Consequences
OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSE
1. Situate the logic of validity, using comparative disciplinary perspectives, and identify
continuities and discontinuities among (legal and assessment) theorists who seek to address the
consequences of testing on historically disadvantaged and vulnerable K-12 student populations.
2. Assess the limits of current judicial treatments of psychometric research and expertise, with an
eye toward facilitating judicial incorporation of current expert practices in those fields.
3. Examine the psychometric grounds used to reach judicial decisions in cases (Debra P. for
example) that challenge the disparate impact of educational testing systems on historically
disadvantaged students.
CORE ARGUMENT & SIGNIFICANCE
Over the past three decades, a rich and textured debate in the field of psychometrics has
produced new theories of testing, grounded in more holistic ideas of validation. These
approaches have sought to account for inequality of inputs, and have focused on incorporating
the larger social consequences of test usage into the assessment of test validity. Broadly
speaking, these developments have been grouped under the label ‘consequential validity,’ a term
designed to illustrate the more complex ways in which validity should be understood to
operate. In 1999, this expanded notion of validity was incorporated into the Psychological
Testing Standards.
However, despite significant movement within these fields, very little appears to have changed in
the legal treatment of validity as a benchmark for assessing the development of public policy. In
the courts, ‘validity’ still means much the same as it did in the 1970s—with a focus on ‘content’
or ‘construct’ validity, and a concern for the predictive value of testing systems. This cramped
approach obscures the consequences of using ‘validity’ as a reference point for educational
outcomes.
The lack of effective communication between these two fields impoverishes the work done on
both sides. For psychometrics, the lack of translation into legal outcomes exposes the limited
effectuality of attempts to delineate ‘best practices.’ Conversely, for the law, failure to
acknowledge developments in the field reveals a troubling gap between the idea of deference to
expertise and the reality of selective incorporation.
Our central claim is that the failure to effectively bridge the gap between the way in which
‘validity’ is conceived by psychometric and legal communities significantly impedes the effort to
provide fair and just educational outcomes. Practitioners on both sides of the divide tend to
regard ‘validity’ as a neutral device, capable of generating discrete packets of information, which
may then be ported across fields of knowledge. However, this act of translation often obscures
the functions of power at the interstices of educational policy.
Our study analyzes this effect by looking to judicial treatments of validity, in particular the way
that psychometric expertise has been integrated into legal analysis. Specifically, we ask: How are
courts thinking about validity in testing and what is ignored about validity discourse in judicial

renderings of landmark cases such as Debra P. Why are plaintiffs unable to convince judges
about broader consequences of testing on historically disadvantaged students?
PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK
The underlying structure of our argument is a comparative evaluation of two debates within
psychometrics and law: the Popham/Shepard debate on consequential validity, and the
Hart/Dworkin debate on the nature of legal meaning. We argue that Hart (1958, 1994) and
Popham (1997) pursue analogous objectives, in that both emphasize the need for defenses
against conceptual leakage. They both demand a firewall between the production of facts and the
use to which those facts are turned. This means treating ‘validity’ as a subject for experts (within
communities of knowledge), which must be translated in whole across the boundaries between
communities. Further, while both regard knowledge as essential to good decision-making, they
reject the attempt to blur the line between factual/objective claims and moral/political ones. For
them, validity is discrete, neutral, depoliticized.
Conversely, Dworkin (1986) and Shepard (1993; 1997) represent the inclination to regard
knowledge as interpretive, collaborative, and shared across boundaries. For them, the ‘validity’
of a thing is wrapped up in the manner of its consequences. For both Shepard and Dworkin, to
speak of a ‘valid’ system requires formulating a broader framework of justice. As such, they
each focus primarily on the usage of concepts, and emphasize the need to regard knowledgeclaims as multifaceted and permanently unsettled.
The Dworkin-Shepard/Hart-Popham analogy offers significant explanatory potential. By
highlighting formal structure of disputes we clarify why some validity arguments tend to be
stickier and others smoother in translation between communities. In particular, expert testimony
pitched in Popham’s terms is more likely to be well-received by judges influenced by Hart’s
point of view. In the case of the law, the practical necessities of the job drive judges toward a
model of interpretive deference (Posner, 1993).
METHODS
To explore this effect, our paper employs both qualitative textual analysis and quantitative
methods for case analysis using the Lexis-Nexis database.
We initiate the qualitative approach to textual analysis by focusing on a key benchmark case:
Debra P. v. Turlington (644 F. 2d 397 1981), which concerned the legality of high stakes testing
as a device for determine the assignation of high school diplomas. At issue in Debra P. was a
high school exit exam intended to measure general competency of Florida high school students.
The students raised both Equal Protection and Due Process claims. This test, the students argued,
was unfair and biased, disproportionately affecting minority students and those already ill served
by the state educational system.
The 5 Circuit’s decision in this case found in favor of the students, but only in a narrow sense.
The problem was not the broader equality concerns raised by such tests, but merely that this
specific test had been insufficiently validated. The state had not shown a proper correlation
between the content of the exam and the purposes to which they used the results it generated. In
order to legitimize a test (‘validate’ the legality of the punitive effect), the state must show that
the test has ‘curricular validity.’
th

Notably, the structure of this “validation” approach was endorsed by expert testimony from
psychometricians on both sides of the case. By close textual analysis (including review of
evidence from depositions) we identify how evolving Standards that would have advanced the
notion that validity as on-going, a matter of degree, and based on carefully assembled types of
evidence to support an intended use was largely ignored. Moreover, both plaintiffs and
defendants agreed that the appropriate measure of due process in this case was the validity of the
purpose to which the test is employed. This agreement allowed the court to narrow its legal
responsibilities, for example, by demanding deeper deliberation on test consequences and use
(Messick, 1988, 1995) and instead delegated the task of adjudicating validity to the external
experts.
Debra P. provides an excellent case study for the discontinuities in treatment of validity, as well
as a useful framework for connecting the twin debates within these two communities. By our
methodological approach, we trace how Debra P. signals a rejection of the Dworkinian
approach, which would require treating validity as a relational concept that necessarily crosspollinates with the constitutional rights questions raised by the plaintiffs.
Our quantitative approach takes Debra P. as a starting point for further judicial treatments of
validity in the context of testing. In order to assess the use and interpretation of these terms, we
have gathered an extensive set of judicial opinions and law reviews from the past three decades,
which will be coded using a Python-based linguistic analysis tool to assess: 1) the frequency of
relevant terminology over time—as concepts have developed within psychometric fields, as they
are translated into judicial treatments 2) the relational usage of different terms—when validity is
discussed, how it is used and 3) connected key phrases and points of reference within case law
archives.
RESULTS
Cross-sectional analyses of these case documents yields a relatively fine-grained picture of
where validity sits in current legal approaches. But even a relatively simplistic initial test
(searching keywords on Lexis-Nexis over 100 years) exposes a stark discrepancy, with hundreds
of judicial opinions employing the language of ‘content’ or ‘construct’ validity, and no
substantive references to the newer standards.
The early results from our database review indicate a strong correlation in judicial opinions
between validity concepts and procedural due process claims. This finding also supports our
intuition that Debra P. is an exemplar of judicial attitudes toward psychometric concepts, despite
their evolution. Rather than regarding validity as a contact point for substantive or equality-based
concerns, courts appear to regard it as merely a technique for navigating procedural thickets.
Our findings suggest that judges are using their own conceptions of validity (in the legal sense)
as bridges for understanding and incorporating treatments of validity produced by external fields.
Absent a well-developed theory to situate an idea like consequential validity, judges will
naturally employ their existing analytic architecture (developing through centuries of debate over
the nature of law, and generally framed through the language of ‘due process’). In the instance of
Debra P. the consequences of this choice became apparent when the case was reheard in 1984.

In effect, the court utilized a narrow concept of validity to shield itself from the obligations of
directly adjudicating the thorny constitutional rights issues at stake in this case.
IMPLICATIONS
When it comes to issues like those raised in Debra P. and its progeny—the outcomes of
educational policy, high-stakes assessment, constitutional protections of due process and equal
protection—the existence of a parallel language of validity creates an easy outlet. By reducing
constitutional protections to questions of ‘test validity,’ courts shift the burden of judgment to
outside experts. In doing so, these courts import a technique of validation, and thereby shield
themselves from the troublesome necessity of adjudicating justice claims. The tests are valid or
not (as determined by experts), and their uses are good or bad (as determined by political actors).
On either side, courts are freed from the responsibility of final judgment. They have effectively
re-distributed the “validity burden” back onto society (Superfine, 2004).
Left out of this juridical reasoning process, however, is a recognition that these external
psychometric experts are only articulating one specific idea of validity. Namely: the “Popham
model,” which is far more translatable to settled case law precisely because it shares the same
presumption that final judgments can be separated from discrete packets of knowledge. In effect,
the convergence of (Popham’s explicit and Hart’s implicit) theories of validity shield
practitioners of law from a serious reckoning with the problem that any given theory of validity
must itself be subjected to scrutiny (Messick, 1989, 1994; Kane, 1992, 2013; Haertel & Herman,
2005).
One crucial effect of this tendency is to devalue perspectives that emphasize broader and more
interpretive models of validity. We note that Shepard seems to have ‘won’ her debate with
Popham—as reflected in new standards for validity which include consequences and fairness
(AERA, APA, NCME, 1999/2014). But where testing policy encounters legal judgment—where
the rubber meets the road, and where most test construction and implementation challenges
actually manifest—Popham’s logic still dominates. Courts tend to side mostly with Hart: seeking
to decide narrow questions of legal meaning, and to avoid responsibility for determining the
political implications of their decisions.
However, this should not be treated as a fait accompli. While it is beyond the scope of our paper
to propose alternative models for legal treatment, one key implication of this argument is that the
process is a two-way street. Recognizing the parallel structures of jurisprudential reasoning with
the law and psychometric reasoning with Testing Standards might allow for a productive
reconfiguration of both sides, where the impulse toward interpretive, collaborative, expansive
knowledge-frameworks can better attach itself to the systems of legal judgment.
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